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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
THE STATE OF UTAH : 
Plaintiff/Appellee : 
v. : 
ROLLO KENT BICKLEY : Case No. 20010416-CA 
Priority No. 2 
Defendant/Appellant : 
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF THE PROCEEDINGS 
This is an appeal from a judgment of conviction for criminal nonsupport, a class A 
misdemeanor, in violation of Utah Code Annotated section 76-7-201 (1999). This Court 
has jurisdiction over this appeal under Utah Code Annotated section 78-2-2(3)(i) (1996), 
which grants this Court jurisdiction over cases not involving a first degree or capital 
felony. 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES, STANDARDS OF REVIEW AND 
PRESERVATION OF THE ARGUMENTS 
1. Trial judges have statutory authority to order criminal defendants to pay 
restitution for crimes for which they (1) have been convicted; (2) agree to pay as part of a 
plea agreement; or, (3) admit responsibility at sentencing. Appellant Rollo Kent Bickley 
pleaded guilty to criminal non-support for failing to pay child support for the period 
between February 1, 1997, and January 10, 2000. Did the trial judge err in ordering Mr. 
Bickley to pay restitution for the entire period dating back to 1987? 
This Court reviews trial courts' interpretations of restitution statutes for 
correctness. State v. Mast. 2001 UT App 402, f7, 40 P.3d 1143. In several motions and 
hearings, Mr. Bickley argued that the trial court lacked authority to impose restitution for 
any period outside the dates specified in the Information. R. 144,175, 253, 354, 470, 
471.l 
2. The Utah and United States Constitutions guarantee criminal defendants 
numerous fundamental rights including, notice of criminal charges, a preliminary 
hearing, to be free from prosecution twice for the same offense, the presumption of 
innocence, proof beyond a reasonable doubt, and a jury trial. The sentencing court 
ordered Appellant to pay restitution for conduct not charged in the Information and for 
which he had previously been charged and finally dismissed. Did the imposition of 
restitution for non-charged conduct impinge on Mr. Bickely's basic constitutional rights? 
This Court reviews constitutional issues for correctness. Mast, 2001 UT App 402, 
Tf8, 40 P.3d 1143. Mr. Bickley challenged the constitutionality of ordering him to pay 
restitution in a pretrial motion and at a subsequent hearing. R. 144, 175, 253. 
!The volume marked 470 contains a transcript of a hearing on a motion to limit the 
amount of restitution. The envelope marked number 469 contains the presentence 
investigation report. Volume 471 contains the sentencing hearing transcript while 
volume 515 contains the transcript of the plea change hearing. The internal page 
numbers of those volumes are included after "R." and the volume number. 
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RELEVANT STATUTORY AND CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS 














Judgement of Conviction, March 30, 2001 
Plea Agreement, December 6, 2000 
Plea Change Hearing, December 6, 2000 
Sentencing Hearing, March 30, 2001 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-201 (1999) 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-7-201 (1999) 
U.S. Const. Amend. V 
U.S. Const. Amend. VI 
Utah Const, art. I, §7 
Utah Const, art. I, §10 
Utah Const, art. I, §12 
Utah Const, art. I, §13 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
On June 29, 1999, the State filed an Information charging Mr. Bickely with third 
degree criminal nonsupport for failing to pay child support for his two teenage children. 
R. 1-2. The criminal Information specified that Mr. Bickley failed to make court-ordered 
payments from February 1, 1997, to June 15, 1999. R. 1. The trial court subsequently 
amended the Information and extended the non-payment period to September 2, 1999. 
R. 1,31. 
On September 2 and 7, 1999, the trial court held a preliminary hearing and bound 
over Mr. Bickley on the charge. R. 35-36. Judge Anne Stirba was assigned to the case. 
R. 35. The trial court later amended the Information and again extended the nonsupport 
period to January 10, 2000. R. 1, 144-45. 
On January 19, 2000, Mr. Bickley filed a motion in limine to bar the State from 
admitting any evidence at trial that Mr. Bickley had failed to pay child support prior to 
the dates alleged in the Information. R. 136. Then, on January 27, 2000, Mr. Bickley 
filed a motion to declare the nonsupport statute unconstitutional or to limit the offense to 
the period specified in the Information. R. 144, 175. The State opposed the motions. R. 
184, 191. Judge Roger Bean conducted a hearing on the motion and agreed that the 
statute was partly unconstitutional but allowed the prosecution to continue under a 
different part of the statute. R. 253, 257-263. 
On December 6, 2000, Mr. Bickley pleaded guilty to a class A misdemeanor for 
criminal nonsupport. R. 515: 16; Addenda B, C. Judge Stirba accepted Mr. Bickley's 
guilty plea and ordered the Department of Adult Probation and Parole (" APP") to 
conduct a presentence investigation. R. 515: 16-18. 
Prior to sentencing, Mr. Bickley filed a motion to determine the amount of 
restitution and to limit any restitution award to the period specified in the criminal 
Information. R. 354. The State opposed the motion. R. 367. Judge Pat Brian held a 
hearing on the motion and later ruled that the trial court had authority to award restitution 
for all payments arrears prior to the dates listed in the Information. R. 412-13, 470. 
On March 30, 2001, Judge Brian sentenced Mr. Bickley to 365 days in jail but 
stayed the sentence and ordered Mr. Bickley to serve nine months in jail beginning on 
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December 1, 2000. R. 471: 11-12; Addendum D. He also placed Mr. Bickley on three 
years of probation and ordered him to pay a fine of $2,500, which he stayed. R. 471: 11. 
For restitution, Judge Brian ordered Mr. Bickley to pay $32,024.00 which covered the 
period dating back to the birth of Mr. Bickley's oldest child in 1982, and which even 
predated his marriage. R. 386-92; 471: 12. Mr. Bickley filed a notice of appeal on April 
27,2001. R.418. 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
In 1985, Mr. Bickley married Vickie Hitesman. R. 469: 6. This relationship 
produced two children: Joshua Ryan, born October 5, 1982, and David Cody, born 
August 7, 1985. R. 2. The Bickleys divorced on April 22, 1987. R. 381. The trial court 
awarded Vickie custody of the children and ordered Mr. Bickley to pay $175 a month for 
each child in support payments and $100 a month in alimony. R. 382. 
In 1994, the State prosecuted Mr. Bickley for failing to pay child support for the 
period between June 1, 1993, and March 31, 1994. R. 145. In September of 1994, the 
trial court conducted a jury trial which resulted in a deadlock. R. 145. Rather than 
conducting a new trial, the trial court granted a defense motion to establish a diversion 
program for one year. R. 368. The State's opposed the motion. R. 145, 368. The trial 
court ordered Mr. Bickley to pay $400 a month and increased the payment to $450 a 
month beginning in February of 1995. R. 368. Mr. Bickley successfully completed the 
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diversion program and on October 27, 1995, the trial court dismissed the action. R. 145. 
On June 29, 1999, the State charged Mr. Bickley with third degree felony 
nonsupport. R. 1. Since February of 1997, Mr. Bickley had only paid $311.15 in 
support payments. R. 368. The charging document specifically defined the period of 
non-support as between February 1, 1997, and June 15, 1999. R. 1. The trial court later 
amended the Information and extended this period to January 10, 2000. R. 1. The trial 
court conducted a preliminary hearing and bound the case over to Judge Anne Stirba. R. 
35-36. 
Shortly after the bind over, Mr. Bickley filed a notice under Utah Code Annotated 
section 76-7-201(5) (1999) that he planned to rely at trial on the affirmative defense of 
"inability to provide support." R. 39. Specifically, in August of 1997, Mr. Bickley 
visited the doctor with complaints of weight gain, fatigue and abdominal pain. R. 400, 
402. Mr. Bickley reported that his health had prevented him from working for the past 
four to six years. R. 402. The doctor diagnosed Mr. Bickley with hypertension and a 
liver condition. R. 400, 402. One year later, in August of 1998, doctors first discovered 
that Mr. Bickley suffered from "profound[] hypothyroidism]1' which was causing his 
symptoms. R. 400. By November of 1999, Mr. Bickley's medication had improved his 
condition. R. 402. 
Mr. Bickley also filed a motion in limine to bar the State from admitting any 
evidence at trial that he had failed to pay child support prior to the dates alleged in the 
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Information. R. 136. About a week later, Mr. Bickley filed a motion to declare the non-
support statute unconstitutional and to limit the amount of arrearages to the dates 
specified in the Information. R. 144, 175. Effective May 3, 1999, the legislature 
increased the penalty for non-support from a class A misdemeanor to a third degree 
felony if the offender "commits the crime of nonsupport in each of 18 individual months 
within any 24-month period, or the total arrearage is in excess of $10,000." 1999 Utah 
Laws, ch. 89, §1 (codified at Utah Code. Ann. § 76-7-201 (3)(c) (1999)). Mr. Bickley 
argued that the phrase "total arrearage" was unconstitutionally vague because it did not 
specify whether the statute applied to all arrears or only to the period specified in a 
charging document. R. 148-150. Mr. Bickley argued further that allowing the State to 
penalize offenders for conduct outside the charging period would violated numerous 
constitutional rights including the rights to notice, proof beyond a reasonable doubt, the 
presumption of innocence, a jury trial, and to be free from multiple prosecutions for the 
same offense. R. 151-60. The State opposed both the motion in limine and the motion 
challenging the constitutionality of the nonsupport statute. R. 184, 191. 
Judge Roger Bean entertained the motion raising the constitutional issues and 
conducted a hearing on it. R. 253. In a written decision, Judge Bean ruled that the 
phrase "total arrearage [] in excess of $10,000" unconstitutionally allowed the state to 
avoid proving that the defendant's failure to pay support was criminal rather than legally 
excusable such as for health reasons. R. 263. Judge Bean found, however, that 
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criminalizing the failure to pay support 18 out of 24 months properly required the State 
to prove criminal intent. R. 257-58. 
Following Judge Bean's decision, Mr. Bickley entered an agreement to plead 
guilty to a class A misdemeanor for nonsupport. R. 342. The agreement provided that 
Mr. Bickley admitted to failing to pay support M[d]uring the period February 1, 1997 and 
January 10, 2000." R. 345; Addendum B. Mr. Bickley conceded that he understood that 
the trial court could require him to pay restitution. R. 346. The agreement explained that 
Mr. Bickley lfagree[d] that total victim restitution be entered in the amount of my 
obligation for child support arrears that I owe for my children, with the understanding 
that the amount of court ordered restitution and monthly [payments] remain to be 
determined by the court.11 R. 347. 
Judge Stirba conducted a change of plea hearing and questioned Mr. Bickley 
about his understanding. R. 515; Addendum C. The prosecutor explained that he 
entered the agreement because Judge Bean's decision precluded the State from 
convicting Mr. Bickley for arrears in excess of $10,000. R. 515: 3-4. The prosecutor 
also conceded that Mr. Bickley had suffered from a "severe" case of hypothyroidism 
which may have justified his failure to work in 18 out of 24 months. R. 515: 3. 
In explaining the possible sentence, Judge Stirba stated that restitution was "a sure 
thing . . . because restitution is the child support that you did not pay before." R. 515: 
11-12. Mr. Bickley stated that he understood that he would have to pay restitution. R. 
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12. After canvassing Mr. Bickley, Judge Stirba accepted his guilty plea and ordered APP 
to conduct a presentence investigation. R. 515: 5-16. 
Prior to sentencing, Mr. Bickley filed a motion to determine the amount of 
restitution and to limit any award to the dates specified in the Information and plea 
agreement. R. 354. He asserted that under the restitution statute the trial court could 
only require him to pay damages for the period specified in the Information. R. 359-60. 
Because Mr. Bckley's oldest child married on August 21, 1999, support obligations for 
that child ended then. R. 355. Thus, from February 1, 1997 through August of 1999, 
Mr. Bickely owed $350 a month. R. 360. That period consists of 31 months for a total 
of $10,850 (31 months x $350). From September 1999 through January 10, 2000, Mr. 
Bickley owed $175 a month or a total of about $933.2 R. 360. The total payments owed 
amounted to $11,783 ($10,850 + $933). Of this amount, Mr. Bickely had paid $311.58 
leaving a remainder of $ 11,471.42 owed. 
The State opposed the motion and argued that Mr. Bickley had agreed to pay 
"complete restitution" but to leave the final amount up to the sentencing judge. R. 369. 
According to the State, complete restitution meant any arrears even beyond the period 
specified in the Information. R. 372. That amount totaled $34,473.96 including 
2This amount includes five months at $175 or $875. In addition, Mr. Bickley 
owed for 10 days in January 2000 or approximately one-third of one month. One-third 
of $175 is $58.33. Eight-hundred-seventy-five dollars plus $58.33 equals $933.33. Mr. 
Bickely's motion does not account for the 10 days in January 2000. R. 360 
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$6,950.96 in interest. R. 372. 
Judge Pat Brian presided at a hearing on the motion to limit the amount of 
restitution. R. 470. He reasoned that the Utah Code authorized the State Office of 
Recovery Services to enforce child support obligations and to collect support from any 
money judgment or order against a parent. R. 413. Based on this law, Judge Brian 
concluded that Mr. Bickley's agreement to pay "complete restitution" allowed the 
sentencing court to impose restitution for all arrears. R. 413. Accordingly, he denied the 
motion. R. 413 
Judge Brian conducted a sentencing hearing on March 30, 2001. R. 471; 
Addendum D. Initially, defense counsel asked Judge Brian to clarify whether the dates 
in the Information limited the amount of restitution. R. 471: 2-3. Judge Brian simply 
ruled that Mr. Bickley was "required to pay child support and will be ordered to pay child 
support for the entire time that a child support order was in place." R. 471: 3-4. 
APP recommended placing Mr. Bickley on probation, requiring him to maintain 
full-time employment, and to pay "full restitution." R. 469: 12. At the time of 
sentencing, APP had not determined the amount of restitution owed. R. 469: 4. 
Judge Brian expressed astonishment that the State was not recommending any jail 
time and declared that there was "no question" that Mr. Bickley would be sent to jail. R. 
471: 8. Upon inquiring about why Mr. Bickley had not supported his children, Judge 
Brian derisively chastised him for allowing the mother and charitable organizations to 
10 
assume responsibility for preventing his children from becoming "beggars on the street." 
R. 471: 9. When Mr. Bickley and defense counsel explained that Mr. Bickley's health 
problems had interfered with his ability to work, Judge Brian stated that "many people in 
this town get up and go to work every morning that have health problems that are equal 
to or greater than the most serious health problem you've ever experienced, and they do 
it because they have a sense of commitment to their family." R. 471: 11. 
Judge Brian then sentenced Mr. Bickley to 365 days in jail but stayed the sentence 
and ordered him to serve nine months in jail beginning on December 1, 2000. R. 471: 
11-12. He also placed Mr. Bickley on three years of probation and ordered him to pay a 
fine of $2,500 but stayed that amount. R. 471: 11, 14. He further ordered Mr. Bickley to 
write a letter of apology to his children. R. 471: 13. 
As for restitution, Judge Brian ordered Mr. Bickley to pay $32,024.00 which 
dated back to the oldest child's birth in 1982, prior to Mr. Bickley's marriage in 1987. R. 
386-92; 471: 12. Judge Brian also ordered him to pay this amount in installments 
beginning with $500 on the first of each month and another $500 on the 15th of each 
month. R. 471: 12. Judge Brian admonished Mr. Bickley to "sell cars, sell property, [or] 
work 80 hours a week" "like some of the rest of us do in this courtroom today do and 
have done all of our adult lives." R. 471: 12-14. He finally warned Mr. Bickley that "[i]f 
he's a day late or a day short" he would revoke probation. R. 471: 12. This appeal 
followed. R.418. 
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SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
Sentencing judges have authority to impose restitution for convictions, when the 
defendant admits responsibility for a crime at sentencing, or if the defendant agrees to 
pay restitution as part of a plea agreement. Mr. Bickley was not convicted of any crimes 
outside the period specified in the Information. Moreover, the sentencing judge failed to 
firmly establish that Mr. Bickley admitted responsibility for any uncharged crimes as 
required under Utah law. Likewise, Mr. Bickley did not agree to pay restitution for other 
crimes as part of his agreement to plead guilty. The sentencing judge lacked authority to 
impose restitution for any uncharged offenses. 
Allowing sentencing judges to impose restitution for uncharged crimes without 
the defendant's assent raises numerous constitutional concerns. The lack of notice 
violates basic due process rights. Criminal defendants in Utah also have a state 
constitutional right to a preliminary examination. The restitution award in this case raises 
double jeopardy concerns because Mr. Bickley finally resolved a prior prosecution that 
may involve the same conduct in this case. Failure to establish the defendant's 
agreement or admission of responsibility also risks defeating the presumption of 
innocence, relieving the State of its burden of proof, and depriving defendants of the 
right to a jury trial. Firmly establishing Mr. Bickley's agreement and admissions would 
have avoided all of these constitutional considerations. 
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ARGUMENT 
I. BECAUSE THE TRIAL COURT NEVER FIRMLY 
ESTABLISHED THAT MR. BICKLEY AGREED TO 
PAY RESTITUTION FOR ALL ARREARS, IT ERRED IN 
IMPOSING RESTITUTION 
Utah law authorizes sentencing judges to impose restitution in only three 
circumstances. None of those situations arise in this case for the period outside the dates 
identified in the Information. Thus, Mr. Bickley requests this Court to remand this 
matter to the trial court to correct the restitution award. 
Judge Brian erred in imposing restitution for the entire arrears dating back to 
1983. Utah Code Annotated section 76-3-201 authorizes trial courts to pay restitution 
for crimes of which the defendant (1) is "convicted;11 (2) "for which the defendant admits 
responsibility to the sentencing court;" or, (3) "for conduct for which the defendant has 
agreed to make restitution as part of a plea agreement." Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-
201(l)(b), (4)(a)(i) (1999): see also State v. GallL 967 P.2d 930, 937 (1998) (limiting 
restitution to these three situations). Because Mr. Bickley pleaded guilty only to 
nonsupport between February 1, 1997, and January 10, 2000, he was not "convicted" of 
any crime outside that period. Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-20l(l)(b). When the State has 
not charged or convicted a person of a crime, the trial court lacks authority to impose 
restitution unless one of the other circumstances listed above applies. Galli, 967 P.2d at 
937. 
Mr. Bickley never "admitted] responsibility" for nonsupport outside the period 
13 
charged. Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-20l(l)(b). In fact, Mr. Bickley's defense below 
centered on his inability to provide for his children for health reasons. Early in the 
prosecution, Mr. Bickley notified the State that he planned to rely on the "affirmative 
defense that [he was] unable to provide support." Utah Code Ann. § 76-7-20l(5)(a) 
(1999). Mr. Bickley claimed that his health problems began several years before he first 
visited the doctor in 1997. Even the prosecutor conceded at the plea hearing that he had 
agreed to a plea bargain because Mr. Bickley suffered from a "severe" case of 
hypothyroidism. R. 515: 3-4. 
Further, throughout the proceedings below, Mr. Bickley repeatedly argued that he 
only owed restitution for the period defined in the Information. He first filed a motion in 
limine to preclude any mention at trial of nonsupport before February 1, 1997. Soon 
after, he requested the trial court to declare the nonsupport statute unconstitutional 
because it appeared to allow the State to prove a crime based on all arrears even if they 
occurred outside the charging period. Judge Bean agreed with Mr. Bickley and ruled that 
the nonsupport statute could only be read as requiring the State to prove criminal conduct 
during the period charged in the Information. 
Even after pleading guilty, Mr. Bickley took no chances and argued in a motion 
that the sentencing judge could only impose restitution for the period charged. Then, at 
sentencing, defense counsel requested Judge Brian to clarify his ruling on this point 
because the judge did not directly address it in his order denying the motion. In sum, at 
14 
every stage of the proceedings, Mr. Bickley denied responsibility for any arrears outside 
the period specified in the Information. 
This Court has ruled that for a defendant to admit responsibility for restitution, 
Mthe criminal conduct must be firmly established, much like a guilty plea, before the court 
can order restitution." State v. Watson. 1999 UT App 273, ^ 5, 987 P.2d 1289 (emphasis 
added). The "trial court must insure that formalities of an admission are met before 
restitution can be ordered." Id. In Watson, for example, the defendant accused the 
defendant of driving the getaway car in a murder and selling the car after the crime. Id_ 
at f^2. The defendant ultimately agreed to plead guilty to obstruction of justice for selling 
the car. Id, The sentencing judge "made inferences about" the defendant's involvement 
in the murder and ordered the defendant to pay restitution for that crime. Id. at ^ [5. 
This Court ruled that the sentencing judge had not firmly established that the 
defendant had admitted responsibility for the murder. Id. Rather, the trial court could 
only impose restitution for a non-charged crime based on specific "admissions made to 
the sentencing court" rather than inferences. Id. Mr. Bickley not only failed to 
specifically admit responsibility for uncharged nonsupport, he repeatedly denied 
responsibility for any crimes outside the charged dates. 
This Court's recent opinion in Mast, 2001 UT App 402, 40 P.3d 1143, even more 
clearly establishes error. There, the defendant pleaded guilty to receiving stolen property 
for possessing a watch and several rings that were taken in a burglary. Id. at }^5. At 
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sentencing, the defendant admitted that she received the stolen property but she 
disclaimed any knowledge of the other items taken in the burglary. Id. In making this 
admission, she conceded that her story may seem "far-fetched." IcL at ^17. The 
sentencing judge ordered the defendant to pay restitution for all of the items taken during 
the burglary. Id. at ^[5. 
Relying on Watson and GallL this Court ruled that the sentencing judge only had 
authority to impose restitution for the watch and the rings found on the defendant. 
Specifically, this Court concluded that the defendant had admitted no specific 
involvement in the burglary nor did the sentencing judge "'firmly establish!]'1' the 
defendant's participation in that crime. Id. at ^fl8 (quoting Watson, 1999 UT App 273, 
[^5, 987 P.2d 1289). This court found that the defendant's characterization of her story as 
"far-fetched" merely amounted to a concession that her story was "unbelievable . . . but 
d[id] not meet the standard of the cases cited above." Id. Accordingly, the restitution 
order violated the plain language of the restitution statute. IdL. For the same reasons, 
Judge Brian lacked power to impose restitution for possible crimes occurring outside the 
period specified in the Information. 
The frequent change in judges may explain why Judge Brian failed to firmly 
establish Mr. Bickley's agreement concerning restitution. Different judges presided at 
the preliminary hearing, heard the motion on the constitutionality of the nonsupport 
statute, accepted the guilty plea, and then sentenced Mr. Bickley. Thus, Judge Brian may 
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not have been as familiar with the case had he presided over the entry of the guilty plea 
as well. 
Moreover, Judge Brian appeared to harbor contempt for either Mr. Bickley 
personally or the crime of nonsupport in general. His comments at sentencing indicate a 
lack of appreciation for Mr. Bickley's undisputed poor health. Instead, he seemed 
determined to impose full restitution regardless of the law. The continuously changing 
judges and Judge Brian's antagonism toward Mr. Bickley combined to produce an 
erroneous restitution award. 
Mr. Bickley also never "' agreed to make restitution as part of a plea agreement."1 
Watson, 1999 UT App 2 7 3 , p , 987 P.2d 1289; Mast, 2001 UT App 402,^[9, 40 P.3d 
1143 (both quoting Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-20l(4)(a)(i) (1999)). The only provision in 
the written plea agreement that even hints of an admission was Mr. Bickley's statement 
that he ffagree[d] that total victim restitution be entered in the amount of my obligation 
for child support arrears." R. 347 (emphasis omitted). The plea agreement did not define 
the phrase "total restitution." Further, none of the trial court judges ever canvassed Mr. 
Bickley about this agreement. 
If anything, the written plea agreement demonstrates that Mr. Bickley only agreed 
to pay restitution for the dates specified in the Information. He specifically admitted that 
he neglected to pay child support M[d]uring the period between February 1,1997 and 
January 10, 2000." R. 345. The agreement then listed the amount owed for each month 
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,f[d]uring that period." R. 346. Nowhere, does the agreement mention any liability for 
nonsupport outside of those dates. 
In fact, the parties appear not to have had a common understanding on restitution.3 
The parties concurred that the written plea agreement rendered Mr. Bickley liable for 
"total restitution" but deferred to the sentencing judge to determine the "court-ordered" 
amount. R. 470: 3-4. The restitution statute generally defines "complete restitution" as 
the amount a plaintiff could collect in a civil action. Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-20 l(4)(c), 
8(b) (1999). That statute, nevertheless, grants sentencing judges discretion to set the 
actual amount of restitution owed, which it labels "court-ordered" restitution. IdL at § 
4(c), 8(c). In determining that amount, the sentencing judge must consider several 
factors including the defendant's ability to pay and the rehabilitative benefit of imposing 
restitution. IdL at § 8(c). 
The prosecutor misunderstood the meaning of "complete restitution." He believed 
that phrase allowed the sentencing judge to impose restitution for all arrears owed. But, 
as Watson and Mast hold, restitution is not open-ended. Rather, the restitution statute 
limits awards to three situations: (1) "convicted" offenses; (2) specific "'admissions] of 
3In any event, the parties' understandings appear to be irrelevant. Watson and 
Mast require "'the sentencing court'" to firmly establish that the defendant specifically 
admits responsibility for conduct not charged in the Information. Mast 2001 UT App 
402,1|13, 40 P.3d 1143; (quoting Watson, 1999 UT App 273, ^ [5, 987 P.2d 1289). The 
prosecutor's and the defendant's "'state of mind'" are irrelevant under this test. Id. 
(quoting Watson. 1999 UT App 273, ^5, 987 P.2d 1289). 
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responsibility to the sentencing court;"1 and, (3) '"conduct for which the defendant has 
agreed to make restitution as part of a plea agreement."1 Watson, 1999 UT App 273, ^|3, 
987 P.2d 1289; Mast. 2001 UT App 402, f 9, 40 P.3d 1143 (both quoting Utah Code 
Ann. § 76-3-201 (l)(b), (4)(a)(i) (1999)). Because none of those three situations apply, 
the sentencing judge erred in ordering Mr. Bickley to pay restitution for the period 
outside the amount specified in the Information. 
II. ALLOWING SENTENCING JUDGES TO IMPOSE 
RESTITUTION FOR PERIODS OUTSIDE THE 
CHARGING DOCUMENT IMPLICATES BASIC 
FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS 
Imposing restitution following a guilty plea without canvassing the defendant 
about uncharged conduct implicates numerous state and federal constitutional provisions. 
Mostly prominently, the defendant fails to receive adequate notice of the charges. The 
Utah Constitution similarly provides criminal defendants a right to a preliminary 
examination. This case also implicates the right to be free from being punished twice for 
the same offense because Mr. Bickley finally resolved a prior prosecution for support 
arrears. Further, the failure to canvass the defendant affects the rights to require the State 
to establish guilt beyond a reasonable doubt, the presumption innocence, and a jury trial. 
These constitutional concerns require sentencing judges to ensure that defendants have 
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agreed to pay restitution when they have pleaded guilty.4 
Allowing trial courts to impose restitution for uncharged offenses without an 
explicit agreement or admission of responsibility impinges on several essential rights. 
First, this approach violates criminal defendants' federal due process right to notice of 
the charges. Due process, at its most basic level, requires notice of the charges lodged 
against the accused. Rock v. Arkansas. 483 U.S. 44, 51 (1987). This right includes the 
State's "duty to inform a defendant, within reasonable limits, of the time when the 
offense charged was alleged to have been committed." State v. Laracuente. 534 A.2d 
882, 884 (Conn. 1987) (internal quotations omitted). At the very least, the State must 
provide a "time frame" for the offense when the State has that information. State v. 
Stark. 470N.W.2d 317, 320 (Wise. Ct. App. 1991); see also State v. Ortega. 751 P.2d 
1138, 1140 (Utah 1988) (State must specify time of an offense). 
The Utah Constitution applies with equal or greater force. Utah appellate courts 
have found that the Utah Due Process Clause is even more expansive than the federal 
one. State v. Ramirez. 817 P.2d 774, 778 (Utah 1991); Foote v. Utah Bd. of Pardons . 
4In accepting guilty pleas, trial courts must ensure that the defendant knowingly 
waives his or her constitutional rights. State v. Visser. 2000 UT 88, ^[11, 22 P.3d 1242. 
Under Utah Rule of Criminal Procedure 11, "the trial court [must] personally establish 
that the defendant's guilty plea is truly knowing and voluntary and establish on the record 
that the defendant knowingly waived his or her constitutional rights." Visser. 2000 UT 
88, Tfl 1, 22 P.3d 1242 (internal quotations omitted). Utah Courts have described this 
approach as one of "strict compliance." State v. Thurman. 911 P.2d 371, 372 (Utah 
1996). 
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808 P.2d 734, 735 (Utah 1991). Allowing judges to impose restitution without alerting a 
guilty-pleading defendant that he or she may be required to pay for periods which the 
State has never charged violates that right. 
Second, awarding restitution without a canvass on the applicable time periods 
violates the state constitutional right to a preliminary hearing. Utah Constitution, article 
I, section 13, requires prosecutions to proceed by "by information after examination and 
commitment by a magistrate." "[A] criminal defendant cannot lawfully be tried for and 
convicted of a crime for which he or she was not given, or for which he or she did not 
waive, a preliminary hearing." Ortega, 751 P.2d at 1139. When sentencing courts 
impose restitution for conduct outside the charging period, the defendant is denied the 
right to test the uncharged conduct at a preliminary hearing. 
Third, the trial court may have violated Mr. Bickley's right to be free from 
multiple punishments for the same offense. Monge v. California, 524 U.S. 721, 728 
(1998); State v. Maguire. 1999 UT App 45, f7, 975 P.2d 476. Both the state and federal 
constitutions bar multiple punishments for one offense. U.S. Const. Amend. V; Utah 
Const, art. I, §12. Mr. Bickley successfully completed a diversion program for failing to 
provide support between the dates June 1, 1993, and March 31, 1994. The trial court 
then dismissed the charges against him. Courts cannot re-prosecute defendants for an 
offense that "was terminated by a final order." Utah Code Ann. § 76-l-403(l)(b) (1999). 
The record is not clear whether Judge Brian's restitution order included any 
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arrears accumulated during the period of the prior prosecution. At sentencing, the State 
produced a chart of Mr. Bickley's payment history dating back to 1982. R. 386-98. 
Although it appears that Mr. Bickley's arrears did not increase during the period of the 
prior prosecution, the State credited him for no payments and it accrued interest during 
this period. R. 389-90. Thus, Mr. Bickley may have been punished twice for some of 
the same conduct. 
Fourth, criminal defendants have a right to the presumption of innocence. State v. 
Daniels. 2002 UT 2, ^20, 40 P.3d 611 That right "is axiomatic and elementary, and its 
enforcement lies at the foundation of the administration of our criminal law.11 Coffin v. 
United States. 156 U.S. 432, 453 (1895). Convicting defendants for crimes without 
considering the effect this right has on uncharged conduct raises due process concerns. 
Fourth, criminal defendants also have the right to require the State to prove every 
element of a crime beyond a reasonable doubt. State v. Lopes, 1999 UT 24, If 13, 980 
P.2d 191 Burdening the State to prove guilt beyond a reasonable doubt is 
"indispensable" to protecting the accused "'from dubious and unjust convictionsf.]5" In_ 
re Winship. 397 U.S. 358, 362, 364 (1970) (quoting Davis v. United States . 160 U.S. 
469,488 (1895)). But, imposing restitution without informing the defendant of the time 
period or without the defendant's assent tends to relieve the State of its burden of proof. 
Fifth, the absence of a canvass deprives criminal defendants of the right to a jury 
trial without a valid waiver of that right. Criminal defendants have both a federal and 
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state constitutional right to a jury trial for all felonies. Lopes, 1999 UT 24, ^ [16, 980 P.2d 
191; U.S. Const. Amend VI; Utah Const, art. I, §§10, 13. Defendants cannot knowingly 
waive that right when sentencing judges fail to canvass them about offenses outside the 
period in the charging document. 
Requiring sentencing courts to "firmly establish" that guilty-pleading defendants 
have admitted responsibility for uncharged crimes or have otherwise agreed to pay 
restitution ensures that defendants knowingly waive their basic constitutional freedoms. 
State v. Watson, 1999 UT App 273,1J5, 987 P.2d 1289. On the other hand, allowing 
sentencing judges to forego canvassing criminal defendants risks violating basic rights 
and condones unjust sentences. To guarantee the constitutionality of restitution awards, 
sentencing judges must firmly establish that defendants agree to pay for uncharged 
crimes or admit responsibility for them. Id. 
CONCLUSION 
Mr. Bickley requests this Court to remand this matter for a new restitution hearing 
with instructions to limit restitution to the period specified in the Information. 
Submitted, this ,2/^cday of March, 2002. 
; ci' "y1^^  
KENT R. HART 
Attorney for Defendant/Appellant 
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Plea: Guilty - Disposition: 12/06/2000 {Guilty Plea} 
SENTENCE JAIL 
Based on the defendant's conviction of CRIMINAL NONSUPPORT a Class 
A Misdemeanor, the defendant is sentenced to a term of 1 year(s) 
The total time suspended for this charge is 1 year(s). 
SENTENCE FINE 













Case No: 991912861 
Date: Mar 30, 2001 
Total Principal Due: $0 
Plus Interest 
ORDER OF PROBATION 
The defendant is placed on probation for 3 year(s). 
Probation is to be supervised by Adult Probation & Parole, 
Defendant to serve 9 month(s) jail. 
Defendant is to report by December 1, 2001. 
Defendant is to pay a fine of 0 
PROBATION CONDITIONS 
Usual and ordinary conditions required by the Department of Adult 
Probation & Parole. 
Defendant is to pay child support arrears in the amount of $32,024 
Defendant is to pay $500 on the 1st of each month and $500 on the 
15th, beginning April 15, 2001. This amount will include the 
current support. The payments will go to ORS. 
Defendant is ordered to obtain and maintain full-time work. 
Defendant is to write a letter of apology to both of his children. 
Defendant is to serve 9 months jail beginning December 1, 2001. 
The Court will hold a review on November 30, 2001 at 10:00 a.m. 
Dated this ^ J day of /ft,£4 <T A / 20_6 / 
PAT^B. BRIAN M
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District Court Judge/; >\ 4 *;Jz 
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE CITY 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff, 
v. 
ROLLO KENT BICKLEY, 
Defendant. 
STATEMENT OF DEFENDANT, 
CERTIFICATE OF COUNSEL 
AND ORDER 
Criminal No. 991912861FS 
Judge: Anne M. Stirba 
ROLLO KENT BICKLEY, the defendant in this case, state as follows with 
respect to my entry of plea of guilty in the above-captioned case: 
The charges to which I am pleading guiltv 
I hereby confirm the entry of my voluntary plea of guilty to the following: 
POSSIBLE 
CRIME DEGREE MAXIMUM 
SENTENCE 
3H> 
Count I: Criminal Non-Support Class "A" Misdemeanor 365 Days Jail Prison 
UCA §76-7-201 $2,500 Fine 
I have received a copy of the charge against me alleged in Count I of the 
INFORMATION herein, I have read it and I understand the nature and elements of the 
offense for which I am pleading guilty. 
Rule 11 Utah Rules of Criminal procedure Advice 
Rule 11(e)(1) representation by counsel. 
I know that I have the right to be represented by an attorney and that an 
attorney will be appointed to represent me by the Court at no cost to me if I cannot afford 
one. I have not waived my right to legal counsel. My attorney has been appointed and my 
attorney is Marnie D. Flores of Salt Lake Legal Defenders. I have had an opportunity to 
discuss this statement, my rights and the consequences of my pleas with my attorney prior 
to the execution and filing of this statement and the entry of my plea before this Court. I am 
satisfied with my attorney and my attorney's advice. 
Rule 11(e)(2) voluntary pleas. 
I am entering this plea voluntarily. I know I do not have to plead guilty to 
anything. I want to enter this guilty plea and I have decided to do so of my own free will. 
Rule 11 (e)(3) presumption of innocence. 
I have the right to the presumption of innocence. That means that if I wish to 
contest the charge against me, I may enter a plea of "not guilty'1 and the matter will be 
tried. At a trial, I would be presumed innocent unless and until the State proves my guilt 
2 
? M ^ 
beyond a reasonable doubt. I waive this right to the presumption of innocence by 
pleading guilty. 
Rule 11(e)(3) right against compulsory self-incrimination. 
I know I have the right to testify in my own behalf but that if I choose not to do so, 
I cannot be compelled to testify or give evidence against myself and further realize that no 
adverse inferences may or will be drawn against me if I elect to exercise my right not to 
testify. I also realize that by pleading guilty I am waiving my right against self-
incrimination and am admitting that I am guilty. 
Rule 11(e)(3) right to a speedy public trial before an impartial jury. 
I know that I have a right to a trial by an unbiased and impartial jury and that a 
unanimous verdict would be required for a conviction on any count before a jury, and that 
by pleading guilty I waive my right to a jury trial. I also understand that I have a right to a 
speedy trial, one that is not unduly delayed. I understand that my trial, if I were to have 
one, would be open to the public. I waive each of these rights by my plea because I will 
not have a trial. 
Rule 11(e)(3) right to confront and cross-examine witnesses. 
I know that if I elect to have a trial, I have the right to confront and cross-examine 
any witnesses who testify against me or to have them cross-examined by my attorney. 
Rule(e)(3) right to compel the attendance of defense witnesses. 
I know that if I qualify as an indigent, I have the right to have my witnesses 
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subpoenaed at State expense to testify in court upon my behalf I understand that I waive 
this right by my plea. 
Rule 11(e)(4) prosecution has burden and pleas are admissions. 
If I plead "not guilty" the State of Utah will have the burden of proving each 
element of each count beyond a reasonable doubt. I realize that by pleading guilty I 
waive such rights, and that by my plea I am admitting all elements of the offense to which 
I am pleading guilty. I acknowledge that I am guilty of the crime to which I am pleading 
guilty, and acknowledge that the court may find me guilty of all offenses to which I am 
pleading guilty. 
Rule 11(e)(4) elements of the offense 
The elements of the crime of which I am charged are as follows: 
Count I, a Class "A" Misdemeanor: That on about or between February 1, 1997 
and January 10, 2000,1 knowingly failed to provide support for my children, jQshua 
and David Bickley, while they were dependant, under the age of 18 and in needy 
circumstances or they would have been in such circumstances but for support provided by 
a source other than myself or on my behalf. 
My conduct that constitutes the elements of the crime charged is as follows: 
Count I: During the period between February 1, 1997 and January 10. 2000,1 
was aware of my obligation, pursuant to court order, to provide monetary support for my 
children, JOshua Bickley , who was born on October 5, 1982, and David Bickley who was 
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born on August 7, 1985. During that period I should have paid $350.00 per month until 
August, 1999 and $175.00 per month thereafter under the court's order. I had sufficient 
incuilie of lesuuices'available or the capability during the period to contribute) to the-- ^ <zS 
suppoil uf my children bat failed to make payments without good reason. 
Rule 11(e)(5) the maximum sentences. 
I understand the maximum and minimum sentence that may be imposed upon me 
for this offense. 
The penalty provided by statute for the offense in Count I, a Class "A" 
Misdemeanor, is a term of incarceration of 365 days in the Salt Lake County Adult 
Detention Center. I also understand that the offense carries a maximum fine of $2,500.00 
plus an additional 85% surcharge . 
I realize that the maximum possible sentence for the offense may be imposed 
upon me by my plea of guilty and that the sentence for the offense may be for 
imprisonment, a fine, or a combination of both. I also know that in addition to the 
imposition of any fine, an 85% surcharge as required by §63-63a-l, Utah Code 
Annotated, 1953 as amended, will be imposed and that I may be ordered by the Court to 
make restitution to any victim or victims of my crimes. 
Rule 11(e)(6) plea disposition terms and advice. 
My plea of guilty is the result of a plea negotiation conducted between my 
attorney, on my behalf, and the prosecutor from the Utah Attorney General's Office. The 
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terms of the plea negotiation are as follows: 
Terms 
The State will move to amend Count I of the information to charge the offense alleged as a 
class "A" misdemeanor. I will plead guilty to the Count I of the Information and agree that 
total victim restitution be entered in the amount of my obligation for child support arrears 
that I owe for my children, with the understanding that the amount of court ordered restitution 
and monthly remain to be determined by the court.the animint to^iTuRteiLTi 
Advice 
I understand that pursuant to 76-3-405(2)(b) U.C.A. 1953, when a defendant enters a 
plea disposition and later successfully moves to invalidate his conviction, the defendant and 
the prosecution stand in the same position as though the plea disposition, conviction, and 
sentence had never occurred, and the prosecution is free to file the charges that it agreed not 
to file pursuant to the plea disposition. 
I know that any plea negotiation with the prosecution is not binding upon the Court 
and is subject to approval by the Court. I further realize that if sentencing recommendations 
are allowed by the Court, including any promise or concession as to sentencing made by the 
prosecutor, that such recommendations are not binding upon the Court. I also know that 
any opinions which my attorney, any prosecutor, or any other person may have expressed to 
^^~ 
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me as to what they believe the Court may do with respect to sentencing are not binding upon 
the Court. Even though the prosecutor may make a recommendation, the Court does not have 
to go along with the recommendation concerning the sentence, and I could still be sentenced 
to the maximum. 
Rule 11(e)(7) time limits for withdrawing pleas. 
I have been advised of the time limits for filing a motion to withdraw my plea of 
guilty. Specifically, under Section 77-13-6, Utah Code Annotated, 1953 as amended, a 
request to withdraw a plea of guilty must be made by motion within 30 days after the entry of 
the plea. I further understand that any plea may only be withdrawn upon a showing of good 
cause and with leave of the Court and that any effort thereafter to withdraw my plea must be 
by appeal. 
Rule 11(e)(8) right of appeal is limited. 
I know that under the Constitution of the State of Utah, if I were tried and convicted 
by a jury or by a judge, I would have the right to appeal my conviction and sentence to the 
Utah Court of Appeals or, where allowed, to the Supreme Court of the State of Utah, and that 
if I could not afford to pay the costs for such appeal, those costs would be paid by the state as 
required by law. I further understand that I am pleading guilty unconditionally and that I am 
not preserving any issue for appeal. I understand that by pleading guilty I am waiving my 
rights to file an appeal. 
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No undue influence, no additional promises. 
No threats, coercion, or unlawful or undue influence of any kind have been made to 
induce me to enter any plea of guilty and no promises other that as set forth in this statement 
have been made to me. 
I understand this document. 
I have reviewed this statement with my attorney and I understand its provisions. I 
have gone over it carefully and have asked my attorney to explain any words I may not have 
understood. My attorney has done so and I understand the meaning of all the words and 
phrases contained within this statement. I am satisfied with this statement and plea 
disposition. 
I am 48 years of age; I have completed _ years of schooling and I can 
read and understand the English language. 
I was not under the influence of any controlled substance, drug, medication, or 
intoxicant when the decision to enter the plea was made. I am not presently under the 
influence of any controlled substance, drug, medication or intoxicant. 
I believe myself to be mentally capable of understanding these proceedings and the 
consequences of this statement and the entry of my plea of guilty. I am not undergoing any 
counseling or treatment, mentally or medically, which would impair or prevent me from 
knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily entering my plea of guilty or executing and filing 
this statement. 
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I understand that this document sets out the entire plea disposition between 
myself and the State of Utah. 
DATED this / 7 ? day of fte^^lp&t . 2000. 
ROLLO KENT BICKLEY 
Defendant 
CERTIFICATE OF DEFENSE ATTORNEY 
I .certify that I am the attorney of record in this matter for ROLLO KENT BICKLEY, 
the defendant in this case; that I know that the defendant has read the statement. The 
defendant and I have discussed the statement. I believe that the defendant fully understands 
the meaning of its contents and is mentally and physically competent to execute it. To the 
best of my knowledge and belief, after an appropriate investigation, the elements of the crime 
and the factual synopsis of the defendant's criminal conduct are correctly stated and these, 
along with the other representations and declarations made by the defendant in the foregoing 
statement, are accurate and true. 
^rxoM^Pfofti Tin 
MARNIE D. FLORES 
Attorney for Defendant 
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accepted and entered as indicated. 
DATED this I g ^ day of lW&J^>VW 2000. 
LCU^N 
ANNE M. STIRBA 
District Court Judge 
M 
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SALT LAKE CITY, UTAH - DECEMBER 6, 2000 
HONORABLE ANNE M. STIRBA PRESIDING 
P R O C E E D I N G S 
THE COURT: Good morning. 
MS. FLORES: Good morning, J u d g e . 
THE COURT: L e t ' s t u r n t o S t a t e v e r s e s R o l l o Kent 
B i c k l e y . Mr. B i c k l e y i s p r e s e n t r e p r e s e n t e d by h i s c o u n s e l 
M a r n i e F l o r e s . Counsel f o r t h e S t a t e i s N i c h o l a s A n g e l i d e s . 
I ' m s o r r y about t h e d e l a y . T h i s c a s e b e f o r e t o o k 
more t i m e t h a n we thought and we a p p r e c i a t e your p a t i e n c e and 
u n d e r s t a n d i n g . 
T h i s was a c t u a l l y t he t ime s e t f o r t h e t r i a l i n t h i s 
m a t t e r , however , I was informed y e s t e r d a y I t h i n k i t was t h a t 
t h e r e may be - t h a t t h e r e i s a d i s p o s i t i o n t h a t you w i s h t o 
p r e s e n t . 
MS. FLORES: There i s , J u d g e . 
THE COURT: And I i n d i c a t e d t h a t b a s e d on t h a t I ' d be 
w i l l i n g t o s t r i k e t he t r i a l d a t e and h e a r what you h a v e t o s a y 
t o d a y . So l e t me ge t t h e i n f o r m a t i o n i n t h e c a s e . 
Tha t i s t he s i t u a t i o n ; i s t h a t c o r r e c t ? 
MS. FLORES: Yes, Judge . I f I may, f o r t h e r e c o r d , 
i n c r i m i n a l n o n - s u p p o r t what you r e l y on i f you c a n ' t s t r i k e i t 
down f o r i t s e l e m e n t s i s t h e a f f i r m a t i v e d e f e n s e of i n a b i l i t y 
t o p a y . We had a w i t n e s s who we 've t a l k e d a b o u t i n chamber s 
l a s t week, t h a t was our key w i t n e s s i n t h a t and b e c a u s e we 
ii 
1 ! couldn't guarantee his appearance we felt like this was a 
l 
2 I better route to go because we didn't feel like we could be -
3 I that this - we felt like the State could prove the elements in 
4 ! that our portion would only come on the affirmative defense and 
5 | lacking the affirmative defense we felt like this was a better 
I 
6 j - the best way to handle the matter. 
; i 
! ! 
7 | THE COURT: I see. Alright. Very well then, what is I 
8 | the proposed disposition? j 
| j 
9 I MS. FLORES: Judge, w e ' l l be e n t e r i n g a p l e a to Class \ 
10 j A cr iminal n o n - s u p p o r t . And then t h e r e a r e some sen tenc ing j 
i j 
11 ! suggestions and r e s t i t u t i on issues. j 
12 THE COURT: How does that change the elements? 
13 I MS. FLORES: It strikes the 18 of 24 month language 
j 
14 | and -
15 i MR. ANGELIDES: [inaudible] there's the, of course, 
16 ! the $10,000 language as well. 
17 | THE COURT: So that would - the information would be 
18 | amended to read how? 
19 ! MR. ANGELIDES: It would be amended to strike - it 
20 j would be amended on the first page of the information striking 
21 I the third from the last line beginning with, "having committed 
22 | the offense of criminal non-support in each of 18 months of a 
23 | 24 month period and/or by having a total child support 
i 
j 
24 I arrearage in excess of $10,000. And then, of course, changing 
25 | the designation from a third degree felony to a Class A 
1 i m i s d e m e a n o r . 
2 | THE COURT. u< •. •••: <. u - e w i n ' ,4 






m i s d e m e a n o r a s o p p o s e a t ., a 
MS. FLORES: Okay-
'incr. r : i t t o a C l a s s A 
> :-gree f e l o n y . 
« ; n a n a e t h e e l e m e n t s . 
B e g i n n i n g w i t h t h e f o u r t r . I i n*- ;* w o u l d ^ - a o , " T h a t t h e 
9 j dtri"^- - . -- n ,r ct:;out o e t w e e n t h e t i r u i 
10 | d a y of F e b r u a r 1 1997 a;,'; ' i i - •«|M' . lav - f ' ' i n u a r y f MJO kii.rw m q ; y 
I 
l 
11 j f -a . • . .i f ; : . . I d r e n t . j w ' 
12 i J o s h u a Ryan B i c k l e y , a n a Eiavid C o r e y B i c k l e \ . .]a:a -r Irirpp 
13 | b - " ' ' - .i:..- <-
14 | la t n a t c o r r e c t : 
15 i H ' • 
16 
17 
MF* . JAMGEL I bES : Y H: 
THE COURT: vt 11: : \ 1 : a s 1:1: Ie S t a 1: e ag r e ed t o 
y ! t h i s d i s p o s i t i o n ? 
19 | M K ANGELIDES: V u r H- • r . -_v> -• !• . * ^ 
20 I wc t i l d si low ;. a .o: Mr „ Bi c k . ' . - / d - i , in t a c t , ^ U I K J I p o r ' . o n o t 
21 i t h e p e r i o d c h a r a e d s u f f e r f rom tiyj -<^  rT hyr o i d i s m . ." ra t"*- i 
22 | g t l e s s , - re.r e i..*-. ad a . ,*Jt q u e s t i o n a b l e w h e t h e r 
23 ; t h e S r a t e <-ouLi e s t a b l i s h r h*. r^vn^nt - - r t h e 24 m o n t h t h e 
2 1 v i i : ' . . . • -. i 2 m^n th p e r i o d . And 
25 j t h e n L d t e r J u d g e B e a n s d e c i s i o n i n i t i a l l y s t r i k i n g o u r a b i l i t y 
1 I to charge the $10,000 - over $10,000 in the arrearage, we | 
2 ! thought that this would be an appropriate resolution of the j 
3 I case. j 
4 j I ' v e a l s o informed the v ic t im in t h i s ca se of what we j 
i | 
5 | are doing and she did not have any problem with that- I 
i i 
6 | THE COURT: Alright thank you Mr. Angel ides. j 
7 i Ms. Flores, with regard to this matter have you 
8 ; consulted with your client? t 
j 
9 '; MS. FLORES: I have, Judge. I 
10 i THE COURT: Have you explained the charge of criminal j 
11 i non-support, a Class A misdemeanor to him? ! 
12 i MS. FLORES: I have. j 
! 
13 i THE COURT: And have you explained to him his j 
i 
.; i 
14 ; constitutional rights? j 
! 
15 ! MS. FLORES: I have. ! 
j 
16 I THE COURT: Do you be l i eve t h a t Mr. Bick ley j 
i 
17 ! understands the nature of this proceeding and that he' s j 
I 
18 i offering a guilty plea knowingly, voluntarily, and with full j 
19 i understanding of his rights and the possible consequences of j 
20 ! his actions here today? j 
21 j MS. FLORES: Yes, Judge. j 
! i 
22 j THE COURT: And have you gone over the statement of j 
23 | defendant with him? i 
24 ! MS. FLORES: I have, Judge. ; 
25 i THE COURT: Do you believe that he understands each ! 
1 I a n d e v e r y p r o v i s i o n 01 t h i s ^ a t e m e n t ? 
2 i MS. FLORET 
3 | Till1, O/UH'r: t iave you r e v i e w e d t h e e v i d e n c e i:i t h i s 
4 ! m a t t e r w i t h / -ui c l i e n t and «-xpln inert t-o him i-*.-- " ^ l a t l o n s h : r 
5 ! : • , . • • : . . . « . * :. -..^  • : J n . o ,r t e n s e . " 
6 ! MS. FLORES: 1 h a v e . 
7 | Till' i i 'MM': . . . , : . ; L . : . -.ai. . • . .a: . 
i 
8 I r e l a t i o n s h i p ; 
I 
9 | r - -t-v 
i 
i 
10 I THE COURT: L'p you r e l i e v e tha t : t h e r e i s a 
i I . 
1 1 | s u b s t a n t i «> ' :. j 
i i 
12 i o f f e n s e n r.ne m a t t e r wenr to t r i a l ? j 
1 3 j MS. FLOREo: * ! 
14 ! THE COURT: A i n g r r , a< y -u kn ;w of ^ n y reason why 
15 | M r . B i c k l e y s h o u l d iioL p x e a a g u n ' J i • 3 
16 I d i s p o s i t i o n ? 
17 | MS. FLOFES * No, inr tge . 
18 | 1 HE . , , , r . v i -rank y o u . 
j 
19 I Mr . B i c k l e y I ' m g o i n g t o b e a s k i n g y o u s e v e r a l 
2 0 j q u e s t :i : i I s
 :,/ : • mi t' ve s a t 11: I r o u g h -
2 1 | DEFENDANT I "-. . , .r C m . 
i 
22 j i:* •»- ": • - u . e n d a r s . -vo . .^ v e 
2 3 ! s e e n mo -Jo t r* i • i in;mber or rime.-:. So von know t h a t i t I a s ^ 
2 4 1 yr i. . i : -, • , . j . . ! mp. 

































at any time you want to speak with Ms. Flores further all you 
have to do is let me know and I'm happy to give you that 
opportunity, whether it's quietly at the podium or out of the 
presence of the Court; is that clear to you? 
DEFENDANT: Yes, ma'am. 
THE COURT: Mr. Bickley, how old - what is your true 
and correct name? 
DEFENDANT: It's Rollo Kent Bickley. 

















How far have you gone in school? 
I've had two years of vocational school. 
So in addition to high school -
In addition to high school, yes. 
- you've done two vocation - years of 
Yes, ma'am. 
So you read, write, and speak English 
Yes, ma'am. 
Are you under the influence of alcohol or 
No. 
Are you receiving any medical treatment? 
Yes, ma'am. 
6 



















„ n * .: 
DEFENDAN"! 
DEFENDANT 
I'm g e t Liny • " r j 
Those a r e medicaL LOUS p r e s c r i b e s r o r y.-u j 
i:: ESS, ma' am. j 
And do they effect your ability to think j 
. K , i i i j I tjcil t o d a y ? 
1 1 ! 
12 menfa 1 i 1 1 n e s s ? 
13 ! rF ••••*:• 







THE COURT: Do you s u f f e r from any m e n t a l i l l n e s s ? 
DEFENDAr" To. 
THE C'j;jR'l : Are you on p r o b a t i o n o r p a r o l e ? 
DEFENDANT: No. 
THE COURT: Have you consulted with Ms. Flores about 
19 | this plea arrangement? 
2 0 i It,:'::,r;..,^.. ; Y e s i h.ive. 
21 | THE COURT: D'-> you need any a d d i t i o n a l t i m e t o s p - ' v 
2 2 I W i l l i 111 i I >e f i > r t? I j n 1.1 j : , v . ; ; 1 . 
23 ! DEFENDANT: No. 
24 ; T-. ...•!, ' <= p r o p o s e d ' . ha t you p l e a d 
25 ! g u i l t y r.o an ^mended i n f o r m a t i o n , amended t o c r i m i n a l n o n -
s u p p o r t , a C l a s s A m i s d e m e a n o r ; i s t h a t wha t you want t o do 
h e r e t o d a y ? 
DEFENDANT: Yes , ma 'am. 
THE COURT: Alright. Have you read the statement of 
defendant that Ms. Marnie - I'm sorry I keep doing that - Ms. 
Flores -
MS. FLORES: It's okay, Judge Lewis calls me Ms. 
Marnie all the time. 
THE COURT: Alright. 
Have you read the statement of defendant that Ms. 
Flores has prepared for you? 
DEFENDANT: Yes. 
THE COURT: Do you u n d e r s t a n d e a c h and e v e r y 
p r o v i s i o n of t h a t documen t? 
DEFENDANT: Y e s . 
THE COURT: Mr. Bickley, do you understand the nature 
and elements of the offense to which you're entering a plea? 
DEFENDANT: Yes I do. 
THE COURT: Well, to be sure I'll go over those 
elements with you. 
Now, as amended count one, criminal non-support, a 
class A misdemeanor, alleges that in Salt Lake County, State of 
Utah, on or about between the first day of February 1997 and 
September 2na, 1999 -
Is that the final date? 
1 I MR. ANGELIDES ' I n a u d i b l e ] 
2 '• • THE COURT: C i i 1 .1 L. L1 , line jnde i 1 1 .1 .- 1 0 t h i / * f 
3 ; J a n u a r y a l s o ? 
4 1 Mr . "-M^ET.rPF1 ±v d-i • ' • 
5 I T.ir> . ;- T' ^oing to start over tllen. 
6 I AlrigL* !' • b a ^ ^ , ±ne elements of * *\<~ rf^r —• 
7 I t h vnu w o u . J :.v p-ieaaing ryiii 11"y are in Snlt haK- Count/, 
8 ! State «..: Wrat. . r . r -}b< ut between the f : r s f day uf February 
9 ! 1 *4 . Tanuary , . '..^uiion of Tit] e 7 6 
10 ' Chapter 7 Section 201 Utah code annotated 1953 as amended, in j 
i 
i 
11 : t : > ; -: ii • . ,;;.ey :. : on or about between \ 
12
 t tne rirst day •: February 199"- an 1 rne !n';- i v •-•: January 2UUU \ 
i 
! 
1 3 s k ' i ; ; : • : o _ i?i; n ^ r 
14 ! c h n a r e n , r: w: r : : -.nu.j Ryan Bi':klev and David r n r p v Bickley, 
15 ! said chi ] dr en !: e:i i i g i n I :ie.j : ti le • a :i * • : f 1 8 \ ea r s ai id :i i i needy 
16 : c i rcuius tance s r 
1 7 ' D o y u u u n i-* " * ' ' ->. .-:,> 
18 i offense to wh:^h you*':'- ?. ieacing guilty? 
19 I DEFEN!"'£N" ies ma'am. 
20 ! • .:.L. ,;,io; . Alright Mr,,. Bickley, as a criminal 
21 | defendant yr u hnvp certain constitutional n i.t" >: -- * . M | 
22 ! r. < . -n you plead guilty y- i wv«- up rne:>^ 
23 I riqhr :; trmt protect y..i. And r M> . ints that you ; . -•  
2 4 • . , . ..,,-•
 :i,r t , ; i ; . ; v s U . 
25 You give up your presumption of innocence. You uve 
1 up your right to persist in your plea of not guilty and proceed 
2 I to trial. Obviously you give up you right to a trial. You 
3 also give up your right to a speedy trial, and the trial was 
i 
4 j a c t u a l l y scheduled today; do you understand that r igh t? 
i 
5 i DEFENDANT: Yes, I do. 
6 j THE COURT: You give up your right to an impartial 
7 j jury. You give up your right to be represented by counsel at 
8 j trial at no cost to you. No - or virtually no cost to you. 
9 I You give up your right to confront and cross-examine in open. 
10 i court witnesses that are produced against you by the State. j 
! i 
11 | You give up your right to put on your own defense and to compel j 
12 \t the attendance of witnesses in your own behalf at no cost to 
I 
13 | you. You give up your right to be tried by the prosecution 
i 
14 | with the burden on the State to prove beyond a reasonable doubt 
15 | each and every element of this offense charged against you. 
i i 
16 | You must understand that a verdict of guilty at trial 
i 
t 







that's another right that you give up by pleading guilty. 
You give up your right to remain silent during the 
course of the trial and not help the State prove its case 
against you. And you must understand that if you were to 
proceed to trial and remain silent, your silence is not any 
evidence of guilt and the jury would be instructed accordingly. 
24 j You must understand that a guilty plea by you is an 





t h o o f f e n s e t o which you a r ^ pieddiria q i n i r v . 
. j r . 1 I u : , i f ld 
3 I convicted, you have a right * •:. appeal both the conviction and 
4 the 6'Tif^n 
5 I up y~ur i ioir to a p p e a l your s e n t e n c e , -oo based on a p l e a of 
g u i ± t 5 " ' '•: mo* -'r.'" «:Ar^^ +'• • • . - - . - .> ..•* . : • - o 
1 L h i u K i ii\dy h a v e m i s s p o k e t h e r e . 
When ' " o p l e a d o o . I t y , iMi " l ' y f "1 "' I1'",l ' " " 
i 





10 J only appeal the sentence imposed; ao •- *'? j 
11 j Li—Mo.-,, : Y^ <=, i >. | 
THF cnopT: Now, r plndir.-i :•.:!*• - • 1 j 
,.o t,-x^.a.n- • ' •• •..; .; . . a n o e r s t n i i d eacn 
I 
THE COURT: Do you ;uv-w r^*y questions about any of 
DEFENDANT: N o . 
T ' r - • '"• * . ^ . _ .. 
I 
20 | m i sdemeano r , *.no r -: pun i sha r ; i e r>y no r .,-ne yea : -, * n^ Sa . 
i 
21 j Lake County J d i i . - - ^ -. 
i 
22 | automatic 85 percent surcharge on * i.«- tine actual:/ imposed. 
I 
2 3 | And i n a d d i t i o n • • • rice i f 
i 
24 i there has been an economi ~ Los^ ,io a resu.it or this of r^nse t. 














thing in this case. 
MR. ANGELIDES: Yes. I 
THE COURT: Virtually because restitution is the j 
child support that you did not pay before; do you understand? j 
DEFENDANT: I do. j 
THE COURT: Alright. So you can - that is the j 
concept of restitution in this case; is that clear to you? 
DEFENDANT: Yes, it is. I 
THE COURT: Now, in addition, whatever sentence is j 
i 
imposed may be consecutive. Let's just assume for the sake of j 
this discussion that you are charged, tried, and convicted of a \ 
new offense in the future. If that were to happen then that j 
court could impose a sentence on you which could be consecutive I 
to this sentence. And by the term consecutive I mean one I 
sentence served after the other and not served at the same 
time. 
DEFENDANT: Right. 
THE COURT: Now, based on your circumstances, as I 
understand them, and I don't think consecutive sentencing comes 
in to play at all. But I want you to make sure - I wanted to 
make sure that you understand that concept. 
i 
DEFENDANT: Yes. 
THE COURT: Alright, have any threats been made 
against you or promises made to you to get you to enter this 





THE COURT: nie you don 
1 tee will? 
6 j attorney? 









i / XLICL dill . 
-re you satisfied with the advise of your 
p\m 
:here any q u e s t i o n s t h a t you wouia 
.•:*- p roceed inq t a-r.her? 
; . i vou an ^ \ .-'lores 
12 t discuss the evidence that the State has against you: 
13 I DEFF-i' 
4 THE COURT: : .-i you i . iiscuss how that evidence 
i 




THE COURT: Do 
DEFENDANT: 
THE COURT; Mi ei i 
^ , ^ U l w 1°, nil ^ i i i ] . , : 
proviie for tn*~- tnannal support of your minui i r r i \ 
I 
, 'i r :• . 
23 | T^ . JOUPT: And your c h i l d r e n a r e J o s h u a Kyari K i r k 
z4 iiid Da n d ? 
2 5 i DEFENDANT: David Cody. 
1 I THE COURT: Cody? 
2 I DEFENDANT: Yes, ma'am. 
3 I THE COURT: Alright. So is it alright if I amend the 
4 j information to reflect David Cody instead? 
5 | MS. FLORES: Yes, Judge. That's fine. 
! 
i 
6 | THE COURT: Alright. Mr. Angelides? 
i 
7 | MR. ANGELIDES: Yes, o f c o u r s e . 
8 j THE COURT: A l r i g h t I ' m making t h a t m o d i f i c a t i o n a s 
9 | w e l l . 
10 ! A l r i g h t , and t h e y were m i n o r c h i l d r e n under - d u r i n g 
i 
11 | t h o s e t i m e p e r i o d s ; were t he y? 
12 ! DEFENDANT: Yes , ma'am. 
13 j THE COURT: And were t h e y i n needy c i r c u m s t a n c e s ? 
14 ! They n e e d e d t h a t f i n a n c i a l s u p p o r t ? 
15 ! DEFENDANT: I assume t h e y d i d , y e s . 
I 
16 I THE COURT: Alright, you're not contesting that? 
17 j DEFENDANT: No. 
i i 
18 | THE COURT: Alright. And so is the reason that 
j 
19 | you're pleading guilty to this offense because you are in fact 
20 | guilty of it? 
21 | DEFENDANT: Yes I am. 
j 
22 i THE COURT: Are you prepared then at this time to 
23 j sign the statement of defendant that Ms. Flores has there in 
i 
24 ! front of you? 
25 I DEFENDANT: Yes I am. 
14 i 
1 I THE COURT: Then you may do so. 
2 j MS. FLORES: Judge, while he's doing that if I could 
3 | make record, from August of 1999 through January of 2000 one of 
4 j the children had become married and so the support only went 
5 for one child during that time period. 
6 I THE COURT: Alright, from the time the child became 
i 
i 
7 | emancipated? 
! 
I 
8 I MS. FLORES: Exactly. 
| i 
9 I THE COURT: Or actually before the time the child j 
l i 
I i 
10 | became emancipated? ! 
I j 
11 ! MS. FLORES: Yes. ! 
I | 
12 |t THE COURT: Okay. I 
13 j Now, Mr. Bickley, you must understand that even if ! 
j I 
14 | the State agrees to recommend that you be granted probation for j 
15 I this offense that recommendations regarding sentencing are not 
16 I binding on the Court. 
17 | DEFENDANT: Right. 
18 | THE COURT: And I could reject recommendations for 
19 ! probation and have you serve one year in the Salt Lake County 
20 | Jail -
21 | DEFENDANT: Yes, ma'am. 
22 j THE COURT: - and fine you the maximum and order all 
j 
23 | the restitution; do you understand? 
24 i DEFENDANT: I do. \ 
25 | THE COURT: Alright. Now, by signing this statement j 
15 ! 
1 I of defendant as you just have, you are telling me that every | 
2 ! statement in this document is true and correct. And you have [ 
3 ! read this document; have you? } 
4 I DEFENDANT: Yes, I have. i 
5 I THE COURT: And is every statement in it true and 
6 I correct? 
7 | DEFENDANT: Yes, ma'am. 
8 I THE COURT: Okay. Do you have any questions about j 
I i 
9 i any of this? I 
10 ! DEFENDANT: No. \ 
11 ! THE COURT: After thinking about this matter do you j 
12 i, still wish to plead guilty? 
13 'j DEFENDANT: Yes, ma'am. 
14 i THE COURT: Very well then I will amend the 
15 ! information by interliniation. And as to Count 1 of the 
16 | amended information, now having been amended to criminal non-
17 j support a Class A misdemeanor, to that charge what is your 
18 j p l e a ? 
! 
19 j DEFENDANT: G u i l t y . 
20 | THE COURT: A l r i g h t , Mr. Bick ley , I w i l l accep t t h i s 
21 j w r i t t e n statement then t h a t you 've s igned h e r e today and the 
22 j o r a l s ta tements t h a t you've made he re t o d a y . Based on those 
i 
23 | statements and my own observations of you here today I 
i 
24 | s p e c i f i c a l l y find t h a t you unders tand the n a t u r e of e lements of 
25 J t h e of fense to which you ' re e n t e r i n g a g u i l t y p l e a . I f ind 
1 I t h a t you understand the re la t ionsh ip between the fac ts of the 
i 
2 I case and the elements of this offense. I find that you 
I 
3 | understand your cons t i tu t ional r i gh t s as a criminal defendant 
4 ! and the minimum and maximum sen tence t h a t may be imposed for 
5 ! t h i s offense, including the p o s s i b i l i t y of the imposition of 
| 
6 j consecutive sentences. Even though I don't believe that comes 
7 
8 
into play here, I find that you understand the concept. 
I further find that you have freely, voluntarily, and 
9 | knowingly entered a plea of guilty to this offense and that 
I 
10 i there is a factual basis for this plea. 
11 j Based on all of that then I find that you - I will 
12 I, accept your guilty plea and find that you are guilty of 
13 | criminal non-support, a Class A misdemeanor. 
14 | Accordingly I will also sign this statement of 
15 i defendant. And I'm doing so at this time. 
16 j Now, Mr. Bickley, you have other rights at this time. 
17 l The first of which is you have the right to file a motion to 
18 | withdraw your guilty plea. If you wish to do so you must file 
I 
19 | a motion to that effect within 30 days of today's date. 
20 ! Motions like that are only granted by leave of court 
21 ! when good causes have been shown. 
22 ! Second, you have the right to be sentenced in this 
23 j matter in no less than two nor more than 45 days from today's 
24 ; date. And I presume you wish me to order a pre-sentence 
25 i report? 
17 
1 ! MS. FLORES: Judge, we d o n ' t have a pos i t i on on i t 
i 
2 j and i t ' s my u n d e r s t a n d i n g t h a t the S t a t e i s not reques t ing one, 




THE COURT: Alright, well I think I will because 
otherwise - in the absence of one my practice really is to 
sentence to the maximum. 
7 j MS. FLORES: Yeah. 
8 | THE COURT: And there may be mitigating circumstances 
9 | here that you want me to consider. 
10 | MS. FLORES: That's wonderful. 
11 | COURT CLERK: January 19th. 
12 ! THE COURT: Is that beyond the 45 days? 
i 
13 j COURT CLERK: No . 
i 
14 | THE COURT: A l r i g h t . Then s e n t e n c i n g i s s e t for 
I 
i 
15 | January 19, Friday January 19 at 10:00 in the morning. 
16 ! MR. ANGELIDES: Okay. 
17 j THE COURT: Now -
18 | MS. FLORES: Judge. Oh I'm sorry, go ahead. 
19 | THE COURT: Yes? 
20 I MS. FLORES: We - there - when you do a criminal 
21 I non-support there are two issues. One is of complete 
22 ! restitution and one is court ordered restitution, that amount 
23 I being part of their probation. I think we'll agree to the 
24 ! complete restitution and I have a brief that will quickly 
25 | explain - walk you through the statute that outlines how one 
18 i 
comes to a determination of court ordered restitution. 
THE COURT: Alright. 
MS. FLORES: So I've spoken to Mr. Angelides and 
indicated that I think it's helpful so that you're not 
rummaging through the statute without guidance so -
THE COURT: I appreciate that. 
MS. FLORES: I can get that filed. I have one 
basically prepared so I could get that filed within two weeks. 
THE COURT: Alright, and can you also send a copy of 
that to AP&P? 
MS. FLORES: Sure. 
THE COURT: So that they have that in the context of 
the pre-sentence report? 
MS. FLORES: Sure. 
THE COURT: Do you wish to - are you going to be in 
agreement with this or -
MR. ANGELIDES: Well [inaudible] -
THE COURT: Do you want to reserve the right to -
MR. ANGELIDES: I would ask to reserve the right to 
respond if - if -
THE COURT: Yes. 
MR. ANGELIDES: I expect it will pretty well track 
the statute. 
THE COURT: Alright. Let's see, the defendant's 
memorandum will be filed - did you say two weeks from today? 
MS. FLORES: Yes, Judge. I'm in trial next week so 
if I could have two weeks that would be helpful. 
THE COURT: Alright, the 20ch of December. And then 
if there's any memorandum to be filed in opposition to that, 
file that on or before January 3rd. And then I'll have both of 
those to review in advance of the sentencing on the 19th. 
If you would give me a courtesy copy of each of those 
I can take that home when I take home the pre-sentence reports 
for that day. 
MR. ANGELIDES: I was hoping to be on leave most of 
the time between there. I -
THE COURT: Do you want the 10th? 
MR. ANGELIDES: I'll try and make the 3ra. If not 
I'll ask for some more time. 
THE COURT: Is there any objection if... 
MS. FLORES: No. 
THE COURT: Alright. 
MS. FLORES: None. 
THE COURT: Well, then the 3rd if you can but I don't 
hear an objection if you want to file it on or before the 10th 
of January. 
Let's see, we have a slip of paper, Mr. Bickley, for 
you to take to adult probation and parole. I want you to take 
that slip of paper as you leave the courthouse and go directly 
to AP&P at that address immediately after leaving the 
20 
courthouse this morning. 
i 
2 j DEFENDANT: Okay, 
! 
3 | THE COURT: And give that to them. They'll give you j 
4 I a packet of information to fill out. Give you an interview j 
5 I date. Cooperate with them in all respects and then I'll see j 
6 you on the 19th of January at ten o'clock. j 
7 j MS. FLORES: Thank you, Judge. ! 
8 j THE COURT: Alright thank you very much. j 
9 j MR. MGELIDES: Thank you, Judge. I 
i i 
10 | THE COURT: The court is in recess. | 
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1 MS. FLORES: Judge, whether or not the restitution amount 
2 should be limited by the charging period. There's information 
3 - the information is from February of '97 through to January 
4 of 2001. Those were the approximate dates of the charging 
5 document. The complete restitution figure is that entire 
6 figure of all monies owed by the Defendant for unpaid child 
7 support including periods that are before another diversion 
8 agreement that was entered on this same case. So, there are -
9 there are some chunks of whether or not it should -- our 
10 question is: Does it all apply or does it get broken up first 
11 by die information and second by the former charges? 
12 THE COURT: Any response? 
13 MR. ANGELIDES: Yes. The agreement was that restitution 
14 could be ordered for the entire monies that are arrears 
15 (Inaudible) include interest. I believe Counsel's position is 
16 just an argument that it would be appropriate for the Court to 
17 just make court-ordered restitution the amounts of the period 
18 charged in the Information, but there's certainly no statutory 
19 provision requiring that. The deal was that restitution, as I 
20 said, will be ordered for the full amount of the arrears, and 
21 that's what we think the court-ordered restitution (Inaudible) 
22 as well. 
23 THE COURT: it's the Court's position that the Defendant, 
24 pursuant to the case, is required to pay child support and will 
25 be ordered to pay child support for the entire time that a 
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2 State of Utah v. Rollo Kent Bickley, 99-861. 
3 Counsel, state an appearance. 
4 MS. FLORES. Marnie Flores on behalf of Mr. Bickley who is 
5 present. 
6 MR. ANGELIDES: Nick Angelides for the State, Your Honor. 
7 THE COURT. You may proceed. 
8 MS. FLORES: Judge, we are set for sentencing this 
9 morning. I'm in receipt of the written response to our 
10 motion. I think we can go forward with sentencing. I just had 
11 two areas that I'd like to address that I think are not 
12 necessarily covered by the written decision. The first is 
13 whether or not the amount of restitution should be limited by 
14 the information - the period of the information charged or if 
15 all amounts of restitution can be added in; and then the 
16 decision is unclear as to whether or not the rehabilitative 
17 effect, other attendant circumstances and the financial 
18 resources were to be considered or not. So, those are the two 
19 areas that we still have questions on. 
20 And with that, we would submit it, Judge. 
21 THE COURT, counsel? 
22 MR. ANGELIDES: Your Honor, other than (Inaudible) our 
23 briefs, and -
24 THE COURT: Let's take Counsel's concerns one at a time 
H anH criw vnn an nnnnrtiinitv tn resnond. Y o u r first One? 
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1 child support order was in place. 
2 MS. FLORES: okay. Thank you, Judge. 
3 THE COURT: All right. And your next question? 
4 MS. FLORES: The next one was that the statute makes 
5 provisions for variations downward from the complete 
6 restitution for that amount which - he shall be held liable 
7 for for the period of probation. Some of those were other 
8 attendant circumstances, the defendant's ability to pay and -
9 let me see what the third is. 
10 "The financial resources of the 
11 Defendant and the burden that that would 
12 impose, the ability of the Defendant to 
13 pay on an installment basis, the 
14 rehabilitative effect and other 
15 circumstances which make restitution 
16 inappropriate." 
17 THE COURT: All right. Let's start with the basic 
18 concept: If the Defendant received an order of child support, 
19 it is the responsibility of the Defendant to seek modification 
20 of the child support if circumstances change and he is either 
21 unable in some other way incapable of meeting the child support 
22 obligation. Is there any indication in the record that the 
23 Defendant has ever sought the Court -
24 MS. FLORES: NO, Judge. 
25 THE COURT: sought relief from the Court on a petition to 
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1 modify? 
2 MS. FLORES: NO. 
3 THE COURT: it is his responsibility. That's an 
4 affirmative duty he has; otherwise, it's presumed that the 
5 child support order is appropriate. The Court believes that's 
6 very basic fundamental law. 
7 MS. FLORES: Those are our only concerns, then, Judge. 
8 MR. ANGELIDES: Let me just very briefly: The Defendant 
9 has computer skills, and he's gone to school for electronics 
10 about 18 months. He's got only himself to support. And the 
11 (Inaudible) assistance. She's on public assistance, again. 
12 Counsel, in her brief, says that he's willing to pay his 
13 ongoing support obligation, and yet since last summer he's made 
14 only two payments. There was a tax intercept accomplished this 
15 month for about seven hundred and something dollars, but he's 
16 done nothing else. I question - I question how sincere he is 
17 in his expressed desire to make those payments. And according 
18 to the probation report, he's been employed since April of last 
19 year through December, and yet he only made those two payments, 
20 and that's only about S90 each. 
21 The restitution figure that we've come up with - I'm 
22 giving Counsel a copy of that - through February of this year, 
J23 totals $32,Q24.54. 
J24 THE COURT: 32,000 what? 
25 MR. ANGELIDES: 0,24,54. 
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1 THE COURT: is that figure challenged, Counsel? 
2 MS. FLORES: NO, Judge. 
3 THE COURT: A11 right. That is the total amount of 
4 arrearage? 
5 MS. FLORES: Yes. 
6 MR. ANGELIDES: Yes. It is smaller (Inaudible) $700. 
7 THE COURT: Tell the Court the date that the child support 
8 order was issued by the Court. 
9 MS. FLORES. May 5th of 1987, Judge. 
10 MR. ANGELIDES. Thank you. 
11 THE COURT: And thank you, Counsel. 
12 And tell the Court how much child support has been paid in 
13 the previous 12 months, that would be May through April 1 -
14 May of 2000 through March 30 of the Year 2001. 
15 MR. ANGELIDES: okay. You want an exact figure, Judge? 
16 THE COURT: Yes. 
17 MR. ANGELIDES: There were several (Inaudible) here. If I 
18 may just have a moment? 
19 THE COURT: You may. 
20 MR. ANGELIDES: $798.23, and that doesn't count a federal 
21 tax intercept from the 23rd of this month of $772.30. 
22 THE COURT: so, the total is $ 1,500? 
23 MR. ANGELIDES: That's about it. 
24 THE COURT: And what's the child support ordered per 
25 month? 
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1 MS. FLORES: 175. 
2 THE COURT: HOW much? 
3 MS. FLORES: $175. one of the children has been 
4 emancipated. That's why the ongoing is lower. 
5 THE COURT: All right. I think the Court's ready to 
6 proceed. 
7 Counsel, tell the Court why it shouldn't put your client 
8 in jail for a full year. I think that's the very narrow 
9 question the Court wants both sides to address. 
10 MS. FLORES. Judge, I think there are a few reasons. One, 
11 Mr. Bickley, although he doesn't look like he has a good work 
12 history, is really getting things together. The last coup that 
13 we have had is that his driver's license has been returned to 
14 him. We were under the mistaken impression that it had a 
15 criminal non-support hold on it. So, once he's gotten that 
16 back now, he last applied at UTA to be a driver. That looks 
17 really promising. He also has some other job applications 
18 out. Having the ability to get a job that's not just within 
19 walking distance will really free him up to be able to apply 
20 for more jobs. 
21 He has continued contact with his children. I think he's 
22 spoken with Ms. Bickley - Vicky Bickley, the ex-wife. He has 
23 spoken with her this last week to try to come to some sort of 
24 resolution for visitation with the children. She was 
25 withholding them for a time because she felt he wasn't paying 
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1 again, and I think that that's resolved. So, part of what Kent 
2 can do well is to provide for his children in non-monetary 
3 fashion. He helps them whenever he can. And having that 
4 opened back up to him will definitely help that. 
5 Judge, further, with $32,00 of restitution owing, I think 
i 6 it's in everybody's best interest that he can get a job and get 
7 working. I know that he - you may not believe that he's 
8 intending on doing that, but he truly is. And he's ~ he's 
9 really doing his best that he can to get his life back together 
10 and get in a place where he can make these payments and provide 
11 for the children in ways that he hasn't before. 
12 MR. ANGELIDES: consistent with our plea agreement, we are 
13 recommending that he be given the opportunity of probation this 
14 onetime. 
15 THE COURT: when you speak of probation, are you telling 
16 the Court that you are not recommending any jail? 
17 MR. ANGELIDES: At this point, yes, sir. 
18 THE COURT: Let me ask if the Defendant has ever seen the 
19 inside of a jail? 
20 MR. ANGELIDES: I don't think so. 
21 THE DEFENDANT: Absolutely. 
22 THE COURT: when? 
23 THE DEFENDANT. 1970. 
24 THE COURT: well, you are going to see it again today. 
25 There is no question about that. Your recommendation is 
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1 strictly a recommendation. The Court's not bound by it. I'd 
I 2 like to hear from the Defendant why the jail sentence should 
3 not be 365 days. 
4 THE DEFENDANT: well, I obviously can't earn money to pay 
5 for it if I'm in jail. 
6 THE COURT: YOU haven't been paying, anyway. 
7 THE DEFENDANT: Well -
8 THE COURT: what's the difference? 
9 THE DEFENDANT: They have withheld half of my pay all year 
10 long last year, so they were getting half of it. 
11 THE COURT: what do your children think when they 
12 understand that but for the generosity of some charitable 
13 organization or a mother that works 70 or 80 hours a week, that 
14 the kids would be beggars on the street? 
15 THE DEFENDANT: I don't know. I don't -
16 THE COURT: Did you ever ask them? 
17 THE DEFENDANT: NO, I don't, SIT. 
18 THE COURT: Doesn't it seem a little inconsistent that you 
19 go have visitation with these children and then by the same 
20 standard refuse to provide child support? 
21 THE DEFENDANT: Your Honor, I haven't refused. I have 
22 been very, very sick, and that, you know, was documented. 
23 THE COURT: Tell the Court, since 1987, how many - in all 
124 candor, how many days a week or how many weeks out of the month 
25 you have been physically unable to go to work and provide for 
J P a g e l 
1 your family? 
2 THE DEFENDANT: From - let's see, I first got really sick 
3 in '95. 
4 THE COURT: I asked about 1987. 
5 THE DEFENDANT: From then -
6 THE COURT: That's eight years from the date (Inaudible) 
7 order of support (Inaudible) ~ 
8 THE DEFENDANT: Yes. Yes, Your Honor, I was working full 
9 time then, and they were getting their full child support 
110 then. 
11 THE COURT. From *95 to 2001, what's been your medical 
12 history? 
13 THE DEFENDANT: rve had emphysema and thyroid problems. 
14 I've been under Dr. Robert Miller's care. 
15 THE COURT: Have you had any surgery? 
16 THE DEFENDANT, NO, sir. 
17 THE COURT: Has the doctor told you that you were unable 
18 to work at any type of employment? 
19 THE DEFENDANT: NO, but he has -- he has put me on 
120 medication that's done a big difference to me. 
21 MS. FLORES: Judge, if I can just briefly inform you of 
22 some of the background: Dr. Miller treated Mr. Bickley pro 
23 bono and was not very happy with coming to court. We did have 
24 medical records to support from '95 through - well, middle of 
25 '98, that there was some significant health issues related to 
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1 being able to work, and that I think he gave him a clean bill 
2 of health in Spring of '99 to go back to work. And so because 
3 we couldn't get Mr. Miller here, that's why we - he called 
4 Judge Stirba and indicated that he didn't want to be here. 
5 There was some litany of things that went wrong with his 
6 testimony, so that's why we reentered plea negotiations and 
7 were able to take the Class A Misdemeanor, because without the 
8 Doctor we didn't have much of a case. But we did have letters 
9 and notes from him indicating that there was a significant 
10 health trouble for that period. So... 
11 THE COURT: it would be interesting to know how many 
12 people in this town get up and go to work every morning that 
13 have health problems that are equal to or greater than the most 
14 serious health problem you've ever experienced, and they do it 
15 because they have a sense of commitment to their family. 
16 THE DEFENDANT: i understand that, Your Honor. 
17 THE COURT. All right. Any other reason why sentence 
18 should not be imposed? 
19 MR. ANGELIDES: NO, sir. 
20 THE COURT: Defendant stands convicted of a Class A 
21 Misdemeanor for that offense. He will serve 365 days in the 
22 Salt Lake County Jail. He will pay a fine of $2,500. 
23 Imposition of sentence is stayed. The Defendant is placed on 
24 supervised probation with AP&P for three years. 
25 The terms and conditions of probation are as follows: The 
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1 Defendant will serve nine months in the Salt Lake County Jail. 
2 He'll report to jail on December 1 at 7:00 p.m. to commence the 
3 nine-month jail sentence. 
4 MR. ANGELIDES: judge, when does he start? 
I 5 THE COURT: December 1 at 7:00 p.m. 
j 6 The Defendant is to report to this Court on November -
7 THE CLERK. 30th. 
8 THE COURT: - 30th at 10:00 a.m. in the morning on the 
9 Court's ordered review. 
10 Additional terms and conditions of probation are that the 
11 Defendant will pay child support arrearages. The total dollar 
12 amount as of March 30th of the Year 2001: $32,024. 
13 Child support arrearages are to be paid as follows: The 
14 Defendant will pay $500 on the first day of each month, and the 
15 Defendant will pay $500 on the 15th day of each month starting 
16 April 1. The Defendant will pay $1,000 a month until further 
17 order of this Court. If he's a dollar short or a day late, 
18 I'll accelerate the jail sentence, and he'll report a lot 
19 sooner than December 1. 
20 Let the record reflect: You sell cars, you sell property, 
21 you work 80 hours a week, you do whatever you have to do. Tha 
22 is not an issue of this Court. 
23 MS. FLORES: May I inquire? The 32,000, it sounds like 
24 the offset of the taxes of 7, 72, 30 were not included, so when 
25 you are calculating that total, I think it's necessary to 
^unucnscii 
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1 recognize that that -
2 THE COURT: The intercept was credited; was it not? 
3 MR. ANGELIDES: NO, the figure I gave you was as of the 
4 end of February. There's (Inaudible). 
5 THE COURT: All right. You calculate the interest and 
6 credit him with the intercept, and whatever that dollar amount 
7 is, it's somewhere in the neighborhood of 532,000, give or take 
8 a few hundred dollars, and we'll resolve that at the end. 
9 MR. ANGELIDES: we'll prepare a sentencing order 
10 (Inaudible). 
11 THE COURT: All right. 
12 Additional terms and conditions of probation are: That 
13 the Defendant is to write a letter of apology. 
14 How many children do you have? 
15 THE DEFENDANT: lhavetWO. 
16 THE COURT: I want a letter of apology written to both of 
17 those children whether one is emancipated or not. 
18 THE DEFENDANT: Okay. 
19 THE COURT: And you explain to them whatever you want to 
20 explain, but I want you to make a written letter of apology to 
21 the children about your either inability or your refusal to 
22 provide child support. 
23 THE DEPENDANT: okay, Your Honor. 
124 THE COURT: A copy of those letters are to be included in 
25 this file no later than April 15th, and they are to be 
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1 postmarked no later than April 15th. 
2 Additional terms and conditions of probation are that the 
3 Defendant will work a minimum of 40 hours a week, and my strong 
4 suggestion is that you ratchet that up to about 70 hours a week 
5 like some of the rest of us in this courtroom today do and have 
6 done all of our adult lives. 
7 THE DEFENDANT: Okay. 
8 THE COURT: Furthermore, the Defendant - is the current 
9 child support order only $150 a month? 
10 MR. ANGELIDES: 175,JUdge. 
111 THE COURT: All right. The Court's not going to impose 
12 the fine. The fine portion has been stayed on the grant of 
13 probation for three years. 
14 Here is the Court's position and it is a very simple: 
15 Child support will be paid to the dollar before you are 
16 released from probation. 
17 THE DEFENDANT: Okay. 
18 THE COURT: i i l personally see to that. 
19 THE DEFENDANT: Okay. 
20 THE COURT: Furthermore, you miss one payment, and I'm 
21 instructing the probation department -
22 Where is the probation officer today? 
23 They will be instructed in writing to notify this Court to 
24 prepare an order to show cause if you are found in violation. 
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THE DEFENDANT: Okay. 
THE COURT: it just seems so contrary to everything that 
the Court understands to be important in terms of the family 
relationship for you to turn your back on a family financially. 
MR. ANGELIDES: YOUT Honor ~ 
THE COURT: counsel, wait until I'm through, and I will 
give you a moment to say anything you want. 
You have April, May, June, July, August, September, 
October and November, you've got eight months. There better 
$8,000 paid toward this $32,000 child support arrearage when 
you come here on the 30th of November; otherwise, you bring a 
briefcase full of good reading because you will spend the next 
nine months in the Salt Lake County Jail, and I will not blink 
an eye. 1 
THE DEFENDANT: Okay. 
THE COURT: All right. What else do you want clarified on 
the sentence? 
MS. FLORES: Judge, could we have the first payment start 
on the 15th of April -
THE COURT: indeed. J 
MS. FLORES. - so we don't set him up to fail? 1 
THE COURT: indeed. April 15. 
MS. FLORES: Thank you. 
THE COURT: And then the first and fifteenth day of each 
month thereafter. If the 15th falls on a holiday or a Sunday, 
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it is the following day. 1 
MS. FLORES: okay. 
MR. ANGELIDES: sir, does that thousand dollars a month 
include the ongoing support obligation? 
THE COURT, it is a total payment of a thousand dollars, 
so the arrearage would be reduced by $875, and the ongoing 
child support would be $125, $175. 
MR. ANGELIDES: Fine. Could I ask that the monies be paid 
directly to the Office of Recovery Services? 
THE COURT: so ordered. 
MR. ANGELIDES: And could I ask that our office be 
permitted to monitor those payments in coordination with AP&P? 
THE COURT: Any objection? 
MS. FLORES: NO. 
THE COURT: so ordered. 
MR. ANGELIDES: Thank you very much. 
THE COURT: Now, is there anything else that the Court 
needs to clarify? 
Simply, all we have done is made the Defendant, pursuant 
to a sentencing, do what he's been obligated legally and 
morally to do for - since 1987. 
Good luck. 
MS. FLORES: Thank you, Judge. That concludes my 
matters. If I can be excused? 
MR. ANGELIDES: Thank VOU. Y o u r Hnnnr 1 
t^omicnsciL 
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1 THE COURT: You may, thank you. 
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Utah Code Annotated section 76-3-201 (1999) defines in relevant part the trial 
court's authority to impose restitution: 
(1) As used in this section: 
(b) "Criminal activities" means any offense 
of which the defendant is convicted or any other 
criminal conduct for which the defendant admits 
responsibility to the sentencing court with or 
without an admission of committing the criminal 
conduct. 
(c) "Pecuniary damages" means all special 
damages, but not general damages, which a 
person could recover against the defendant in a 
civil action arising out of the facts or events 
constituting the defendant's criminal activities 
and includes the money equivalent of property 
taken, destroyed, broken, or otherwise harmed, 
and losses including earnings and medical 
expenses. 
(d) "Restitution" means full, partial, or 
nominal payment for pecuniary damages to a 
victim, including the accrual of interest from the 
time of sentencing, insured damages, and 
payment for expenses to a governmental entity 
for extradition or transportation and as further 
defined in Subsection (4)(c). 
(2) Within the limits prescribed by this chapter, a court 
may sentence a person convicted of an offense to any one of the 
following sentences or combination of them: 
(a) to pay a fine; 
(b) to removal or disqualification from 
public or private office; 
(c) to probation unless otherwise 
specifically provided by law; 
(d) to imprisonment; 
(e) on or after April 27, 1992, to life in 
prison without parole; or 
(f) to death. 
(4) (a) (i) When a person is convicted of criminal activity 
that has resulted in pecuniary damages, in addition to any other 
sentence it may impose, the court shall order that the defendant 
make restitution to victims of crime as provided in this 
subsection, or for conduct for which the defendant has agreed 
to make restitution as part of a plea agreement. For purposes of 
restitution, a victim has the meaning as defined in Subsection 
(D(e). 
(ii) In determining whether restitution is appropriate, the 
court shall follow the criteria and procedures as provided in 
Subsections (4)(c) and (4)(d). 
(c) In determining restitution, the court shall determine 
complete restitution and court-ordered restitution. 
(i) Complete restitution means the 
restitution necessary to compensate a victim for 
all losses caused by the defendant. 
(ii) Court-ordered restitution means the 
restitution the court having criminal jurisdiction 
orders the defendant to pay as a part of the 
criminal sentence at the time of sentencing. 
(iii) Complete restitution and court-
ordered restitution shall be determined as 
provided in Subsection (8). 
(8) (a) For the purpose of determining restitution for an 
offense, the offense shall include any criminal conduct admitted 
by the defendant to the sentencing court or to which the 
defendant agrees to pay restitution. A victim of an offense, that 
involves as an element a scheme, a conspiracy, or a pattern of 
criminal activity, includes any person directly harmed by the 
defendant's criminal conduct in the course of the scheme, 
conspiracy, or pattern. 
(b) In determining the monetary sum and other 
conditions for complete restitution, the court shall consider all 
relevant facts, including: 
(i) the cost of the damage or loss if the 
offense resulted in damage to or loss or 
destruction of property of a victim of the offense; 
(ii) the cost of necessary medical and 
related professional services and devices relating 
to physical, psychiatric, and psychological care, 
including nonmedical care and treatment rendered 
in accordance with a method of healing 
recognized by the law of the place of treatment; 
the cost of necessary physical and occupational 
therapy and rehabilitation; and the income lost by 
the victim as a result of the offense if the offense 
resulted in bodily injury to a victim; and 
(iii) the cost of necessary funeral and 
related services if the offense resulted in the death 
of a victim. 
(c) In determining the monetary sum and other 
conditions for court-ordered restitution, the court shall consider 
the factors listed in Subsection (8)(b) and: 
(i) the financial resources of the defendant 
and the burden that payment of restitution will 
impose, with regard to the other obligations of the 
defendant; 
(ii) the ability of the defendant to pay 
restitution on an installment basis or on other 
conditions to be fixed by the court; 
(iii) the rehabilitative effect on the 
defendant of the payment of restitution and the 
method of payment; and 
(iv) other circumstances which the court 
determines make restitution inappropriate. 
ADDENDUM F 
Utah Code Annotated section 76-7-201 defines the crime of criminal nonsupport: 
(1) A person commits criminal nonsupport if, having a 
spouse, a child, or children under the age of 18 years, he 
knowingly fails to provide for the support of the spouse, 
child, or children when any one of them: 
(a) is in needy circumstances; or 
(b) would be in needy circumstances but 
for support received from a source other than 
the defendant or paid on the defendant's behalf 
(2) Except as provided in Subsection (3), criminal 
nonsupport is a class A misdemeanor. 
(3) Criminal nonsupport is a felony of the third degree 
if the actor: 
(a) has been convicted one or more times 
of nonsupport, whether in this state, any other 
state, or any court of the United States; 
(b) committed the offense while residing 
outside of Utah; or 
(c) commits the crime of nonsupport in 
each of 18 individual months within any 24-
month period, or the total arrearage is in excess 
of $10,000. 
(4) For purposes of this section "child" includes a 
child born out of wedlock whose paternity has been admitted 
by the actor or has been established in a civil suit. 
(5) (a) In a prosecution for criminal nonsupport under 
this section, it is an affirmative defense that the accused is 
unable to provide support. Voluntary unemployment or 
underemployment by the defendant does not give rise to that 
defense. 
(b) Not less than 20 days before trial the defendant 
shall file and serve on the prosecuting attorney a notice, in 
writing, of his intention to claim the affirmative defense of 
inability to provide support. The notice shall specifically 
identify the factual basis for the defense and the names and 
addresses of the witnesses who the defendant proposes to 
examine in order to establish the defense. 
(c) Not more than ten days after receipt of the notice 
described in Subsection (5)(b), or at such other time as the 
court may direct, the prosecuting attorney shall file and serve 
the defendant with a notice containing the names and 
addresses of the witnesses who the state proposes to examine 
in order to contradict or rebut the defendant's claim. 
(d) Failure to comply with the requirements of 
Subsection (5)(b) or (5)(c) entitles the opposing party to a 
continuance to allow for preparation. If the court finds that a 
party's failure to comply is the result of bad faith, it may 
impose appropriate sanctions. 
ADDENDUM G 
The Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution provides criminal 
defendants various fundamental rights: 
No person shall be held to answer for a capital, or 
otherwise infamous crime, unless on a presentment or 
indictment of a Grand Jury, except in cases arising in the land 
or naval forces, or in the Militia, when in actual service in time 
of War or public danger; nor shall any person be subject for the 
same offence to be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb; nor 
shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against 
himself, nor be deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due 
process of law; nor shall private property be taken for public 
use, without just compensation. 
ADDENDUM H 
The Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution guarantees criminal 
defendants, among other rights, the right to a jury trial: 
In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the 
right to a speedy and public trial, by an impartial jury of the 
State and district wherein the crime shall have been committed, 
which district shall have been previously ascertained by law, 
and to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation; to 
be confronted with the witnesses against him; to have 
compulsory process for obtaining witnesses in his favor, and to 
have the Assistance of Counsel for his defence. 
ADDENDUM I 
Article I, section 7 of the Utah Constitution provides all persons the right to due 
process of law: "No person shall be deprived of life, liberty or property, without due 
process of law." 
ADDENDUM J 
Utah Constitution, Article I, section 10 provides criminal defendants the right to a 
jury trial: 
In capital cases the right of trial by jury shall remain 
inviolate. In capital cases the jury shall consist of twelve 
persons, and in all other felony cases, the jury shall consist of no 
fewer than eight persons. In other cases, the Legislature shall 
establish the number of jurors by statute, but in no event shall 
a jury consist of fewer than four persons. In criminal cases the 
verdict shall be unanimous. 
ADDENDUM K 
Article I, section 12 of the Utah Constitution grants criminal defendants additional 
rights: 
In criminal prosecutions the accused shall have the right to 
appear and defend in person and by counsel, to demand the 
nature and cause of the accusation against him, to have a copy 
thereof, to testify in his own behalf, to be confronted by the 
witnesses against him, to have compulsory process to compel 
the attendance of witnesses in his own behalf, to have a speedy 
public trial by an impartial jury of the county or district in 
which the offense is alleged to have been committed, and the 
right to appeal in all cases. In no instance shall any accused 
person, before final judgment, be compelled to advance money 
or fees to secure the rights herein guaranteed. The accused shall 
not be compelled to give evidence against himself; a wife shall 
not be 
compelled to testify against her husband, nor a husband against 
his wife, nor shall any person be twice put in jeopardy for the 
same offense. 
Where the defendant is otherwise entitled to a 
preliminary examination, the function of that examination is 
limited to determining whether probable cause exists unless 
otherwise provided by statute. Nothing in this constitution shall 
preclude the use of reliable hearsay evidence as defined by 
statute or rule in whole or in part at any preliminary 
examination to determine probable cause or at any pretrial 
proceeding with respect to release of the defendant if 
appropriate discovery is allowed as defined by statute or rule. 
ADDENDUM L 
Utah Constitution, article I, Section 13, grants criminal defendants the right to a 
preliminary hearing: 
Offenses heretofore required to be prosecuted by 
indictment, shall be prosecuted by information after 
examination and commitment by a magistrate, unless the 
examination be waived by the accused with the consent of the 
State, or by indictment, with or without such examination and 
commitment. The formation of the grand jury and the powers 
and duties thereof shall be as prescribed by the Legislature. 
